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Abstract
We investigate the classical single-period (newsvendor) problem under carbon emissions policies
including the mandatory carbon emissions capacity, the carbon emissions tax, and the cap-and-
trade system. Specically, under each policy, we nd a rms optimal production quantity and
corresponding expected prot, and draw analytic managerial insights. We show that, in order
to reduce carbon emissions by a certain percentage, the tax rate imposed on the high-margin rm
should be less than that on the low-margin rm for the high-prot perishable products, whereas the
high-margin rm should absorb a high tax than the low-margin rm for the low-prot products.
Under the cap-and-trade policy, the emissions capacity should be set to a level such that the
marginal prot of the rm is less than the carbon credit purchasing price. We also derive the
specic (closed-form) conditions under which, as a result of implementing the cap-and-trade policy,
the rms expected prot is increased and carbon emissions are reduced.
Key words: Carbon emissions; single-period model; carbon tax; cap-and-trade.
1 Introduction
The past three decades have clearly witnessed an increasingly serious impact of carbon dioxide on
the environment. The carbon dioxide has been regarded as the main pollutant that is warming the
Earth, as a greenhouse gas that is emitted through transport, land clearance, and the production
and consumption of food, fuels, manufactured goods, materials, wood, roads, buildings, and services
[5]. For the purpose of environmental protection, many governments and organizations have been
contributing to the carbon emissions reduction with a common goal that the carbon emissions
should be reduced by at least half by 2050, as reported by, e.g., the International Energy Agency
[11].
In practice, a great number of governments have implemented some policies to control carbon
emissions. In [6], the Congressional Budget O¢ ce (CBO) of the Congress of the United States
provided a comprehensive study on the policy options for reducing CO2 emissions. We nd from
the CBOs study that there are four major carbon emissions policies as follows: (i) a mandatory
capacity on the amount of carbon emitted by each rm; (ii) a tax imposed to each rm on the
amount of carbon emissions; (iii) a cap-and-trade system implemented to allow the emission trad-
ing; and (iv) an investment made by each rm in the carbon o¤sets to meet its carbon capacity
requirement. In Section 2.2, we shall specify these four major policies, and show that the fourth
policy can be per se regarded as a special case of the third Policy and it should be thus necessary,
and interesting, to investigate the rst, the second, and the third policies.
In this paper we analyze the impact of the three policies on a prot-oriented rms production
quantity decision. We note that many prot-oriented rms have also observed the importance of
the carbon emissions reduction, and responded by developing low-carbon technologies and adopting
new and renewable energy resources. Furthermore, the Barloworld Optimus the logistics arm
of the multinational corporation Barloworld reported that, even though over 80% of carbon
savings are usually achieved at the product design stage, each rm can reduce carbon emissions
by optimizing its operations in production, inventory, and transportation; see, for example, [2] and
[3]. A survey by Accenture.com [1] indicated that more than 86% supply chain executives have
undertaken at least one green initiative in the areas such as recycling, lighting management, and
energy e¢ cient systems. We also learn from [1] that 10% of companies have actively modeled their
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supply chain carbon footprints and implemented successful sustainability initiatives.
For our analysis of carbon emissions policies, we focus on the optimal quantity decision of a
rm making a perishable item with a short lifespan. The production of the item results in carbon
emissions. It is realistic to consider the perishable item for the rm. For example, in [17], the Huber
Group which provides facility services to commercial, industrial, educational, medical, retail,
government, and institutional customers released a technical information regarding the impact
of newspaper printing with the carbon-based ink on the environment. In addition, as reported in
[7], Carbon Trust, a British governmental organisation, suggests that consumers should use real
Christmas trees instead of articial equivalents, because the carbon footprint left by articial trees
is at least ten times greater than real Christmas trees. However, in todays market, the demand
for articial Christmas trees is still very high; for example, Tesco the largest British supermarket
chain sold 300,000 articial Christmas trees in December 2009.
To examine how each carbon emissions policy a¤ects the rms production quantity decision,
we shall involve a corresponding parameter into the classical single-period model, and address the
following questions:
1. What are the rms optimal production quantity decision and corresponding maximum ex-
pected prot under each carbon emissions policy?
2. How does the implementation of a policy inuence the carbon emissions reduction and the
expected prots of the low-margin, the moderate-margin, and the high-margin rms?
3. Does there exist a win-winscenario in which the carbon emissions are decreased while the
rms expected prot is not reduced?
Our paper contributes to the literature by analyzing the single-period problem under carbon
emissions policies and presenting managerial discussion on the incentive of the rm on the carbon
emissions reduction. Even though our discussions on the policies are motivated by the practice of the
U.S., our analytic approach and results should be useful to any government who intends to choose
a proper policy to reduce carbon emissions. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows:
In Section 2, we briey review the relevant literature in Section 2.1, which shows the originality of
this paper; and we present our discussion on existing carbon emissions policies in Section 2.2. In
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Section 3 we consider three policies, and for each policy analyze the single-period model to nd the
corresponding optimal quantity decision. Numerical study with sensitivity analysis are provided in
Section 4. This paper ends with a summary of our results in Section 5. In addition, a list of major
notations used in this paper is given in Table 1.
Notation Denition
 unit purchasing price of the carbon credits
 unit selling price of the carbon credits
c unit acquisition cost of the perishable product
co unit overage cost
cu unit underage cost
C xed carbon capacity
e average carbon emissions per unit of the perishable product
 percentage of the reduction in carbon emissions
Q order/production quantity
Qc mandatory capacity for carbon emissions
s shortage (stockout) cost for each unsatised demand
 tax amount paid by the rm for each unit of the perishable product
v salvage value per unit of the unsold perishable product
X aggregate demand, which is assumed to be a random
variable with the probability density function (p.d.f.) f(x)
and the cumulative distribution function (c.d.f.) F (x).
Table 1: A list of major notations that are used in this paper.
2 Preliminaries: Literature Review and Carbon Emissions Poli-
cies
In this section, we briey review major relevant publications and discuss four carbon emissions
policies, which are preliminaries to our analysis of the single-period problem under carbon emissions
policies.
2.1 Brief Literature Review
We now review major publications that are closely related to this paper where we analyze the
classical single-period model in the presence of carbon emissions policies. For a detailed description
of the classical model, see, e.g., Hadley and Whitin [8]. The single-period model has been widely
used to investigate a variety of problems in the operations management (OM) area. Khouja [12]
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proposed a literature review of various single-period problems. In todays OM area, many scholars
still extend the classical model to incorporate di¤erent objectives and utility functions, address
di¤erent pricing policies, analyze the value of the demand information, etc.
Starting from the middle of 1990s, the carbon emissions-related issues have been attracting
the OM scholarsattention. As a seminal publication, Penkuhn et al. [15] considered the emission
taxes and developed a nonlinear programming model for a production planning problem. Letmathe
and Balakrishnan [14] constructed two analytic models to determine a rms production quantities
under di¤erent environmental constraints. Kim, Janic, and Wee [13] investigated the relationship
between transportation costs and CO2 emissions using the multi-objective optimization method.
Cachon [4] discussed how a reduction in carbon footprints a¤ects supply chain operations and
structures.
In recent two years, an increasing number of OM scholars examine some carbon emissions-
related issues. For example, Hoen et al. [9] investigated the e¤ects of two regulation mechanisms
on the decision on the transportation mode selection. Benjaafar, Li, and Daskin [2] discussed how
the carbon emissions concerns could be involved into the operational decision-making models with
regard to procurement, production, and inventory management. They also provided insights that
highlight the impact of operational decisions on the carbon emissions and the importance of the
operational models in assessing the benets of investments in more carbon-e¢ cient technologies.
Hua, Cheng, and Wang [10] investigated how rms manage the carbon emissions in their inventory
control under the carbon emissions trading mechanism. They derived the EOQ model, and analyt-
ically examined the impact of carbon trade, carbon price, and carbon capacity on order decisions,
carbon emissions, and total cost.
In this paper, we consider the classical single-period problem under three carbon emissions
policies, which signicantly distinguishes our analysis and those by, e.g., Benjaafar, Li, and Daskin
[2] and Hua, Cheng, and Wang [10]. Moreover, we quantify the impact of di¤erent policies on the
emissions reduction and the expected prot of the rm. This further shows the originality of our
paper.
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2.2 Description of Carbon Emissions Policies
We now describe four major carbon emissions policies that are discussed by the Congressional
Budget O¢ ce of the Congress of the United States in [6]. We begin by presenting a summary of
these four policies as given in Table 2, where Q denotes a rms production quantity of the items
that emit the carbon, and Qc means the mandatory capacity of the production that results in
carbon emissions. Moreover, in Table 2,  represents the tax amount paid by the rm for each
unit of the item that emits the carbon; and,  and  denote the rms unit sale price and unit
purchasing price of the carbon credits in the cap-and-trade system, respectively.
Policy Brief Description
Policy 1: Mandatory carbon A rms production quantity Q of the items that emit the
emissions capacity carbon cannot exceed the mandatory capacity Qc.
Policy 2: carbon emissions A rm absorbs the tax  for each unit of the produced item
tax that emits the carbon.
Policy 3: Cap-and-trade A rm with carbon credits prescribed by the policy-maker to
allow the rm to make at most Qc units of the items can sell
its unused credits at the sale price $ per item or buy other
rmsextra credits at the purchasing price $ per item.
Policy 4: Investment in the A rm is allowed to invest for the reduction in carbon
carbon o¤sets emissions to meet the requirement of the mandatory capacity Qc.
Table 2: Four major carbon emission policies discussed by the Congressional Budget O¢ ce of the
Congress of the United States.
Next, we discuss the four policies listed in Table 2 to determine which policies shall be later used
to analyze the single-period problem. For our single-period problem under Policy 1 (mandatory
carbon emissions capacity), the rms optimal decision is subject to the mandatory capacity. That
is, the rm needs to determine an optimal production quantity that maximizes its prot under the
constraint that the rms production quantity Q is smaller than or equal to the mandatory capacity
Qc, i.e., Q  Qc. Note that, to simplify our analysis and facilitate our managerial discussion,
we measure the carbon emissions-related parameters and constraints on the product-unit basis
throughout the paper. This is justied as follows: In reality, carbon emissions can be generated
from production, transportation, inventory, etc. Letting e denote the average carbon emissions
generated by making one unit of product over the single period, we nd that, when the rm has
to adhere to a xed carbon capacity C, he cannot produce more than Qc = C=e products (that
is, Q  Qc). This implies that it is reasonable to use Qc instead of C for our analysis of the
single-period problem.
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For our problem under Policy 2 (carbon emissions tax), there is no carbon emissions con-
straint; but, the rm absorbs the tax on the amount of carbon emissions. Specically, denoting by 
the carbon tax charged for one unit of product, we can calculate the rms total tax payment as Q.
Under Policy 3 (cap-and-trade), the rm has prescribed carbon credits from the policy-maker,
which allow the rm to produce at most Qc units of products. However, the rm can trade extra
(unused) carbon credits through a cap-and-trade system to vary its carbon capacity. This means
that, in the cap-and-trade system, the rm can buy and sell the right to emit.
Under Policy 4 (investment in the carbon o¤sets), the rm can invest in the carbon emissions-
reduction projects to o¤set emissions in excess of the capacity Qc. We note that the investment
under Policy 4 is per se the same as the credit purchase in a cap-and-trade system under Policy 3
with  = 0. That is, if the rms unused carbon credits cannot be sold, i.e.,  = 0, then Policy 3
is equivalent to Policy 4 because  can be assumed to be the unit investment cost. Hence, Policy
4 can be regarded as a special case of Policy 3. For generality, we do not analyze our single-period
problem under Policy 4 in this paper.
According to the above, we subsequently investigate the impact of Policies 1, 2, and 3 on the
optimal decision in the single-period problem.
3 Analysis of the Single-Period Problem under Carbon Emissions
Policies
In this section, we analyze the classical single-period inventory model under three carbon emissions
policies i.e., Policies 1, 2, and 3 in Table 2. Our analytic results are also compared to investigate
the impact of the three policies on the reduction in carbon emissions and the rms expected prot.
Next, we start with the rms single-period inventory problem under Policy 1.
3.1 The Single-Period Problem under Policy 1 (Mandatory Carbon Emissions
Capacity)
For our analysis of the classical single-period problem, we let X denote the aggregate demand,
which is assumed to be a random variable with the probability density function (p.d.f.) f(x) and
the cumulative distribution function (c.d.f.) F (x). In addition, p is the selling price per unit of the
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perishable product; c is the rms unit acquisition cost; s is the shortage (stockout) cost for each
unsatised demand; and v is the salvage value per unit of the unsold product. Then, co  c  v is
the unit overage cost, and cu  p + s   c represents the unit underage cost. Note that Q denotes
the rms order quantity, as dened in Table 1.
Using the above, we write the rms expected prot function as,
J (Q) = (p  v)
Z Q
0
xf (x) dx+ (p+ s  c)
Z 1
Q
Qf (x) dx
 s
Z 1
Q
xf (x) dx  (c  v)
Z Q
0
Qf (x) dx. (1)
We learn from our discussion in Section 2.2 that, in order to nd optimal quantity Q under Policy
1 (mandatory carbon emissions capacity), the rm should maximize its expected prot J (Q) in
(1) under the constraint that Q  Qc, where Qc is the mandatory capacity. That is, the rms
maximization problem under Policy 1 is written as follows: maxQQc J(Q).
Theorem 1 For the single-period problem under Policy 1 (mandatory carbon emissions capacity),
the optimal quantity decision is found as Q1 = min (Q; Qc), where Q is optimal solution of the
classical single-period problem, i.e.,
Q = F 1 (w) , where w  cu
cu + co
=
p+ s  c
p+ s  v . (2)
Proof. For a proof of this theorem and the proofs of all subsequent theorems, see Appendix A.
From the above theorem we note that Policy 1 is e¤ective only when the mandatory capacity
Qc does not exceed the Q, i.e., Qc  Q. Otherwise, if Qc > Q, then the rm always determines
its optimal solution as Q for any value of Qc, which means that the rms optimal solution under
Policy 1 is the same as that with not any policy. It thus follows that, in order to e¤ectively reduce
carbon emissions generated by the rm, the policy-maker needs to set the mandatory capacity as
a value lower than the rms optimal decision under no policy constraint.
Theorem 1 also indicates that we can compute Q1 when the c.d.f. F (x) is explicitly given. For
simplicity, we hereafter assume that the aggregate demand X for the perishable product is normally
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distributed with mean  and standard deviation , i.e., X  N(; ). We thus have,
J (Q) =  (p  c)   (cu + co) (z) , (3)
where z  (Q   )=, and  is the p.d.f. of the standard normal distribution.
3.2 The Single-Period Problem under Policy 2 (Carbon Emissions Tax)
Under the policy, the rm needs to pay the tax $ for each unit of product, as discussed in Section
2.2. This means that the rm incurs the per unit cost $ in addition to its acquisition cost c. Thus,
we can easily write the rms corresponding prot function, by replacing c in J (Q) given in (1)
with c+  . As a result, the optimal production quantity under Policy 2 is given as,
Q2 = F
 1

p+ s  c  
p+ s  v

= F 1 (w2) . (4)
Next, we discuss the e¤ect of the carbon tax  on the reduction in carbon emissions. More
specically, we need to consider the following question: what should be the value of  if we desire
to reduce the rms carbon emissions by a certain percentage. Note that, if Policy 2 does not apply,
then the rms optimal quantity decision is Q, as given in (2); and, if this policy applies, then the
optimal decision is Q2 as in (4). Therefore, the reduction in carbon emissions can be calculated as
  (Q  Q2)=Q.
In addition, we should also consider the impact of the protability-related attributes of the
perishable product on the policy-makers tax decision. As discussed by Schweitzer and Cachon
[16], in the single-period problem, the perishable product with w2  0:5 and that with w2 < 0:5
where w is dened as in Theorem 1 are called a high-prot product and a low-prot product,
respectively. Noting that the aggregate demand X follows a normal distribution, we nd from (2)
that Q   for the high-prot products with w2  0:5, and Q <  for the low-prot products
with w2 < 0:5. Furthermore, it should be interesting to investigate whether or not the rm selling
a high-prot product and the rm selling a low-prot product should have the same tax payment
if they desire to achieve a same emission-reduction percentage .
Theorem 2 If the rm makes a high-prot perishable product (i.e., w2  0:5), then the carbon
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emissions-reduction percentage  is decreasing in c, i.e., @=@c < 0. But, if the rm makes a
low-prot perishable product (i.e., w2 < 0:5), then the carbon emissions-reduction percentage  is
increasing in c, i.e., @=@c > 0. 
As the above theorem indicates, for a high-prot and a low-prot products under Policy 2 with
a xed value of the carbon tax  , we nd that, ceteris paribus, the carbon emissions-reduction
percentage  varies in di¤erent manners as the unit cost is changed. For a high-prot product,
the reduction decreases as c increases, whereas, for a low-prot product, the reduction increases as
c increases. The result implies an important insight from the perspective of the policy-maker, as
given in the following remark.
Remark 1 The policy-maker should consider the attributes of the perishable product and the unit
acquisition cost of the rm, in order to achieve the emissions reduction at a certain desired level.
Specically, for a given value of , if the perishable product belongs to the high-prot category,
then the tax rate  imposed on the high-margin rm (i.e., its unit acquisition cost c is small) should
be less than that on the low-margin rm (i.e., c is high). On the other hand, for the low-prot
product, the high-margin rm should absorb a high tax than the low-margin rm. J
3.3 The Single-Period Problem under Policy 3 (Cap-and-Trade)
Under the policy, the rm has to buy the carbon credits at the per unit price  if it produces
more than the prescribed capacity Qc. We thus calculate the purchasing cost of carbon credits as
 (Q Qc)+, where,
(Q Qc)+ = max(Q Qc; 0) =
8><>: Q Qc, if Q  Qc,0, otherwise. (5)
Note that, if Qc  Q, then  (Q Qc)+ = 0, which implies that the rm make no payment if it
does not need any extra carbon credits. However, the rm may benet from emitting less than the
capacity Qc by selling its unused carbon credits in the trading market. In fact, for the single-period
problem where the unused credits should be salvaged, the rm has to sell unused credits and thus
obtain the revenue as  (Qc  Q)+.
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Therefore, the rms expected prot under the cap-and-trade policy can be written as,
J3 (Q) = J (Q) + (Q Qc)+ + (Qc  Q)+, (6)
where J (Q) is given as in (1); and as discussed above, the second and third terms can be regarded
as the rms penalties and rewards generated by transferring carbon credits under the cap-
and-trade policy, respectively. The rm should maximize J3 (Q) in (6) to nd the optimal quantity
Q3 under Policy 3.
Theorem 3 When Policy 3 (cap-and-trade) is implemented, we nd the rms optimal quantity
decision Q3 as given in Table 3, where Q is the optimal solution for the classical single-period
problem, as given in (2); and,
w  cu   
cu + co
, w  cu   
cu + co
,   dJ(Q)
dQ

Q=Qc
. (7)
Note that  in (7) means the rms marginal prot at the point that Q = Qc. Moreover, the rms
corresponding expected prot is also calculated as in Table 3. 
Condition Qc < Q Qc  Q
  cu Q3 = 0; J3 (Q3) > J(Q) Q3 = 0; J3 (Q3) > J(Q)
cu >  >  Q

3 = F
 1 (w) < Qc Q3 = F
 1 (w)  Qc J3 (Q3) > J(Q)
     Q3 = Qc; J3 (Q3) < J (Q)
 <  Q3 = F
 1 (w) > Qc; J3 (Q3) < J (Q
)
Table 3: The rms optimal quantity decision Q3 under Policy 3 (cap-and-trade). Note that w,
w, and  are dened as in (7).
We learn from Theorem 3 that, if Qc is su¢ ciently high such that Qc  Q, then the rms
optimal production quantity should be smaller than the capacity Qc and the rm should sell its
unused carbon credits under the cap-and-trade policy. For this case, the trade-o¤ between reducing
the production quantity and selling unused carbon credits is that the revenue reduction generated
by decreasing Q from Q to Q3 should be compensated by selling the increments in the unused
carbon credits (i.e., Q  Q3).
Remark 2 Theorem 3 indicates that the rms carbon emissions could be reduced when a proper
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cap-and-trade policy is implemented. Specically, the amount of the carbon-emissions reduction
depends on the values of , , cu, and . In order to assure that the rms carbon emissions are
reduced to Qc or less, the policy-maker should set the unit carbon-credit purchasing cost  no less
than , i.e.,   ; otherwise, Policy 3 may not be e¤ective in reducing carbon emissions that are
generated by the rm. J
We nd from Theorem 3 that Q3 = 0 when   cu. This implies that the rm can prot
more from selling carbon credits than from selling perishable products, when the price for carbon
credits is extremely high. In practice, the policy-maker should e¤ectively manage the cap-and-
trade market to prevent the rm from acting as a carbon credit dealer instead of as a product
manufacturer.
Corollary 1 When Q > Qc and cu >  > , we nd that8><>: J3 (Q

3)  J (Q) , if   0  cu   (cu + co)F (2Qc  Q) ;
J3 (Q

3) < J (Q
) , if  < 0.
Proof. For a proof of this corollary, see Appendix B.
From the above Corollary, we note that, if Q > Qc, cu >  > , and   0, then, as a
result of implementing Policy 3, the rms prot is increased (i.e., J3 (Q3)  J (Q)) and its carbon
emissions are decreased (i.e., Q3 < Qc). That is, under the conditions that Q > Qc, cu >  > ,
and   0, the rm should be willing to reduce its production quantity under Policy 3 and the
policy is thus e¤ective.
4 Numerical Study
In this section we provide numerical examples to illustrate our analysis in Section 3. Since the
analysis under Policy 1 which is provided in Section 3.1 is simple, we next compute the rms
optimal production quantities and expected prots under Policy 2 (carbon emissions tax) and
Policy 3 (cap-and-trade). For simplicity, we assume that the rm does not incur a shortage cost
(i.e., s = 0) and does not have a salvage value (i.e., v = 0). In addition, X  N(500; 150), and
p = 100. We consider several scenarios that di¤er in the values of other parameters including
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the unit acquisition cost c, the carbon tax  , the unit carbon-credit purchasing cost , the unit
carbon-credit selling price , and the prescribed emissions capacity Qc.
4.1 Numerical Example for Policy 2
We now provide an example to illustrate our analysis for Policy 2 in Section 3.2. In this example,
we use four di¤erent values of the unit cost c to represent four types of products, which include
two high-prot products (c = 15 and c = 35) and two low-prot products (c = 65 and c = 85). For
each product, we consider three scenarios, and for each scenario, we compute the corresponding
optimal quantity for the rm.
In the rst scenario, we assume that there is no capacity constraint. Accordingly, we calculate
Q and J (Q). In the second scenario, we assume that the carbon tax  is equal to 10, and
we calculate Q2 and J2 (Q2), which are then compared with Q and J (Q) in the rst scenario,
respectively. We also compute the emissions reduction percentage  = (Q  Q2)=Q and nd the
prot decrease percentage !  [J(Q)   J2(Q2)]=J(Q). In the third scenario, assuming that the
rm desires to reduce carbon emissions by a specic percentage  (e.g.,  = 10%), we calculate Q2,
J2 (Q

2), and !; and also compute the corresponding tax rate  in order to achieve the emissions
reduction percentage . Our numerical results are presented in Table 4.
High-prot Low-prot
c 15 35 65 85
Scenario 1: No Carbon Emissions Policy
Q 656 558 442 345
J (Q) 39; 009 26; 954 11; 958 4; 017
Scenario 2: Policy 2 with  = 10
Q2 601 519 399 254
J2 (Q

2) 32; 741 21; 377 7748 965
(%) 8:34 6:99 9:73 26:38
!(%) 16:07 20:69 35:21 75:98
Scenario 3: Policy 3 with  = 10%
Q3 590 502 398 310
J2 (Q

3) 31; 254 19; 279 7; 688 2; 443
!(%) 19:88 28:47 35:71 39:18
 12:5 14:5 10:2 4:8
Table 4: The rms optimal quantities and corresponding expected profts in three scenarios.
As Table 4 indicates, the rms optimal production quantity is reduced as a result of imple-
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menting the carbon tax policy. From Scenario 2, we nd that, if the per unit tax rate is 10, then
the carbon emissions reduction for the high-prot products decreases as the prot margin (p   c)
decreases, whereas the reduction for the low-prot products signicantly increases (from 9.73%
to 26.38%) as the prot margin declines. We also note that the prot reduction percentage ! is
strictly increasing in c; that is, if the prot margin is reduced, then the prot reduction percentage
is increased.
In Scenario 3, when the carbon-emissions reduction percentage  is equal to 10% for all products,
the tax rate  imposed on the high-prot product with c = 35 should be higher than that imposed
on the high-prot product with c = 15. On the other hand, for the two low-prot products, the tax
rate  should be higher for the product with a smaller value of c. We also nd that, even though
the prot reduction percentage ! increases as the prot margin decreases, the increases for the four
products are not as signicant as those in Scenario 2.
4.2 Numerical Example for Policy 3
We now consider two examples to illustrate our analysis for Policy 3 in Section 3.3. From Theorem
3, we nd that the rms optimal quantity decision depends on the comparison between Q and
Qc. Next, we rst present an example for the case that Qc  Q, using the values of the unit
acquisition cost c for four products as in Section 4.1. Setting the specic values of Qc and  for
each product, we present our calculation results in Table 5, where we nd that, for each product,
carbon emissions are decreased but the rms expected prot is increased.
High-prot product Low-prot product
c 15 35 65 85
cu 85 65 35 85
Qc 706 608 492 395
 10 10 10 10
Q3 601 519 399 254
J3 (Q

3) 39; 799 27; 652 12; 666 4; 914
(%) 8:34 6:99 9:73 26:38
!(%)  2:03  2:59  5:92  22:33
Table 5: The numerical results when Q  Qc.
Next, we present another example to illustrate our analysis for the case that Qc < Q. We
set  = 12:5 and  = 10, and we select three di¤erent values of Qc for each product, as given in
13
Table 6, where we nd the following results. For each product, Q3 is reduced as Qc is smaller; and,
J3 (Q

3) is greater than J (Q
) as long as  > 0. We also nd that Qc more signicantly impacts
Q3 and J3 (Q3) for the low-prot products than for the high-prot products. In addition, if the
prot margin is lower, then the impact of the carbon capacity on carbon emissions and the rms
expected prot are more signicant.
High-prot product Low-prot product
c 15 35 65 85
cu 85 65 35 15
Q 656 558 442 345
J (Q) 39; 009 26; 954 11; 958 4; 017
 12:5 12:5 12:5 12:5
 10 10 10 10
Qc 640 595 550 550 515 480 435 390 345 340 230 180
0 5:42 26:01 49:53 4:01 22:44 39:36 3:57 21:09 30:42 1:45 14:53 14:98
 2:58 11:37 17:08 1:99 11:06 20:35 1:80 11:88 19:97 0:74 11:45 13:40
Q3 601 595 590 519 515 510 399 390 386 254 230 207
J3 (Q3) 39; 139 38; 685 38; 125 27; 072 26; 720 26; 287 12; 096 11; 637 11; 076 4; 363 3; 246 2; 632
(%) 8:38 9:30 10:06 6:99 7:71 8:60 9:73 11:76 12:67 26:38 33:33 40:00
!(%)  0:33 0:83 2:27  0:44 0:87 2:47  1:15 2:68 7:38  8:61 19:19 34:48
Table 6: The numerical results when Q > Qc.
5 Summary and Concluding Remarks
In this paper we investigated the single-period problem under three carbon emissions policies in-
cluding the mandatory carbon emissions capacity, the carbon emissions tax, and the cap-and-trade
system. Under each policy, we obtained the optimal production quantity and calculated the cor-
responding expected prots for the rm. From our analysis we draw some important analytic
managerial insights. For example, we showed that, in order to reduce carbon emissions by a certain
percentage, the tax rate  imposed on the high-margin rm should be less than that on the low-
margin rm for the high-prot perishable products, whereas the high-margin rm should absorb a
high tax than the low-margin rm for the low-prot products.
We also found that, from the perspective of the policy-maker, the emissions capacity should be
set to a level such that the marginal prot of the rm is less than the carbon credit purchasing price,
because, otherwise, the rm would produce more than the emissions capacity. We also derived the
specic conditions under which, as a result of implementing the cap-and-trade policy, the rms
expected prot is increased and carbon emissions are reduced. The conditions assure the rms
and the policy-makers incentives on the cap-and-trade policy.
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The research problem discussed in this paper could be extended in several directions. In future,
we may relax the single-period assumption and consider the quantity decisions of non-perishable
products in multiple periods. In another possible research direction, we may also consider pricing
decision for the rm, assuming the price-dependent aggregate demand in an additive and a mul-
tiplicative function form. In addition, from the policy-maker prospective, it would be nice if one
could propose a way for a rm to select the best policy. The method of choosing the best carbon
emission reduction policy for a given managerial situation likely has critical business implications
for manufacturers.
Appendix A Proofs of Theorems
Proof of Theorem 1. Temporarily ignoring the constrain that Q  Qc, we can solve the classical
single-period problem to nd that
F (Q) = w  p+ s  c
p+ s  v . (8)
Taking the constraint into consideration, we can easily obtain the result in this theorem.
Proof of Theorem 2. To discuss the impact of w on the e¤ectiveness of the carbon tax policy, we
assume that the unit cost c in (4) takes two di¤erent values, e.g., c1 and c2 (w.l.o.g., c1 < c2); and
then, ceteris paribus, the corresponding optimal quantities given by (2) are Q^2 and ~Q2, respectively.
Using (2) and (4), we nd that, replacing c with c +  , the optimal production quantity is
changed from Q to Q2. If  ! 0+, then Q   Q2 =  dQ=dc. Di¤erentiating both sides of
(8) once w.r.t. c, we have, dQ=dc =  1=[(p+ s  v) f (Q)]. It thus follows that, as  ! 0+,
 = (Q   Q2)=Q = 1=[(p+ s  v) f (Q)], which is easily shown to be strictly increasing in Q
when Q   but strictly decreasing in Q when Q < . Therefore, for a high-prot product,
Q^2 > ~Q2, and ^  (Q^   Q^2)=Q^ > ~  ( ~Q   ~Q2)= ~Q, whereas, for a low-prot product, ^ < ~.
This theorem is thus proved.
Proof of Theorem 3. We nd from (6) that J3(Q) is a continuos, piece-wise function in Q. We
next consider two cases: Qc < Q and Qc  Q; and for each case, we compute the corresponding
optimal decision Q3.
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When Qc < Q, we depict four scenarios as shown in Figure 1; and, for each scenario, we
compute the optimal solution Q3 as follows: If   cu, then we nd from Figure 1(1) that J3(Q)
is strictly decreasing in Q over [0;+1); and thus, the optimal quantity maximizing J3 is Q3 = 0,
and J3 (Q3) = Qc   s. If cu >  > , then as Figure 1(2) indicates, Q3 can be obtained as
Q3 = F 1 (w), which is in the range (0; Qc). If     , then, as Figure 1(3) indicates, J3(Q)
is increasing in Q 2 [0; Qc] but decreasing in Q 2 (Qc;+1). The optimal solution Q3 is thus
determined as Q3 = Qc. If  < , then Q3 = F 1 (w) 2 (Qc;+1), as shown in Figure 1(4).
3J
QcQ
*
3 0Q =
3J
QcQ
( )* 13Q F wb-=
3J
QcQ
( )* 13Q F wa-=
3J
QcQ
*
3 cQ Q=
(1) ucb ³ (2)  >uc b g> (3) b g a£ £ (4) a g<
Figure 1: The analysis of J3(Q) in four scenarios: (1)   cu, (2) cu >  > , (3)     , and
(4)  < .
When Qc  Q, we nd from (6) that J3(Q) = J (Q)+ (Qc  Q), which is a concave function of
Q. Similarly, we can show that J3(Q) is a decreasing, concave function of Q in the range (Qc;+1).
Thus, the optimal solution Q3 must exist in the range [0; Qc]. If J3(Q) is also strictly decreasing
in Q 2 [0; Qc], then Q3 = 0. Otherwise, Q3 should be obtained by solving dJ3(Q)=dQ = 0;
that is, Q3 = F 1 (w). Noting that dJ3(Q)=dQjQ=0 < 0 only if  > cu, we nd that Q3 = 0
if  > cu; Q3 = F 1 (w) otherwise. In addition, Q3  Qc because w  w; and, J3 (Q3) 
J (Q) +  (Qc  Q)  J (Q).
Appendix B Proof of Corollary 1
We learn from Theorem 3 that, if cu >  > , then Q3 = F 1 (w) and  (z3) = w. Hence, z3 is
dependent on , and  (z3) can be written as  (z3) =  [1=(p + s   v)]  (d=dz3). Using (3) we
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have,
J3 (Q

3)  J (Q) =  (Qc   ) +  (cu + co) [ (z)   (z3)]
=  (Qc   ) + 0 +  (cu + co) (z) . (9)
Equating J3 (Q3) to J (Q) and solving the resulting equation for , we nd that
 =
 (cu + co) (z
)
Qc    [e
(Qc )(z z3)=   1]. (10)
Substituting  in (9) into (10), we obtain z3 as z3 = z = 2 (Qc   ) =   z. It is easy to show
that the corresponding value of  for z3 is 0 = cu   (cu + co)F (2Qc  Q). We also nd that
J3 (Q

3)  J (Q) > 0 for  > 0 but J3 (Q3)  J (Q) < 0 for  < 0.
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